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The  Therapeutic  Activity  Act  that came  into  force  on  1 July  2011  was  aimed  at achieving  a
large-scale  transformation  of public  hospitals  into  Commercial  Code  companies.  The  change
of the  legal  form,  from  a public  entity  to a for-proﬁt  company,  was  expected  to  improve  the
poor economic  efﬁciency  of  the  public  hospital  sector.  However,  the mere  change  of the  legal
form does  not  guarantee  a  better  ﬁnancial  performance  of  hospitals  and thus  the  success
of the  Act.  In  many  cases,  deep  internal  changes  are  needed  to achieve  improvements  in





national  and regional  levels,  such  as the  mapping  of  health  needs  of the  population,  have
to accompany  the  legal  transformations  in  order  to improve  the  efﬁciency  of  the hospital
sector. The  recent  slowdown  in  the  rate  of the transformations  is  another  factor  that  renders
the  success  of the  Act  uncertain.
© 2014  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).. Introduction – historical background
The legal framework governing Polish health care insti-
utions (public and non-public) has been reformed twice
ince the early 1990s. Between 1991 and 2011, the legal
ramework was prescribed by the 1991 Act on Health
are Units. According to this Act, all public health care
nits (known as ZOZs) could take one of three forms: (1)
udgetary units or establishments, (2) autonomous pub-
ic health care units (known as SPZOZs), or (3) scientiﬁc
esearch units.
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Until the late-1990s the vast majority of public hospi-
tals operated as budgetary units ﬁnanced from budgetary
sources. They were run by the Ministry of Health (and some
other ministries), medical academies, and the regional
State administration (voivodeships). The legal form of the
SPZOZ, introduced by the 1991 Act, was  modeled after the
British NHS trusts and was designed to enable the devel-
opment of an “internal market” in health care. Unlike a
budgetary unit, an SPZOZ had a legal personality and was
obliged to cover all the costs of its activity from its revenues
(coming mainly from public payers) and follow general
accounting regulations. It also had a signiﬁcant autonomy
over its internal organization and decisions on hiring and
remuneration of its personnel (see Table 1 for the key dif-
ferences between a budgetary unit and an SPZOZ).From the mid-1990s, a growing number of budgetary
units had been transformed into SPZOZs [14]. Early trans-
formations (around 100 public health care units between
1993 and 1997) had been initiated by the reform-oriented
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Table  1
Key differences between a budgetary unit and an SPZOZ.
Budgetary entity SPZOZ
What is the share of public ownership? 100% 100%
Does  it have legal personality? No Yes
How  are expenses/costs covered? From budgetary sources From own revenues (mainly from
contracts with public payers)
Who  has control over its ﬁnancial
operations?
Public owner (e.g. Ministry of Health,
Medical Academies, Regional State
Administration)
Director (periodical ﬁnancial
statements are approved by the public
owner)
Who  is ultimately liable for its ﬁnancial
obligations?
Public owner Public owner (public owner must cover
all debts in case of liquidation or
transformation of the SPZOZ)
What  are the main reasons for its
indebtedness?
Internal – Poor management (lack of ﬁnancial
incentives for improving efﬁciency;
expectations that debts would be
cleared or repaid by the State)
Poor management (ﬁnancial incentives
to improve efﬁciency oftentimes
ignored as debts were periodically
cleared or repaid by the State)
External – Insufﬁcient public sources
(insufﬁcient budgets in relation to the
level of infrastructure and activity)
– Rigidity of budgetary rules governing
the budgetary entities (money
allocated in the budget to one
expenditure category, e.g. wages, could
not be used to ﬁnance another
category, e.g. repairs)
–  Lack of regulations against excessive
accumulation of debts
–  Strong pressure (from the local
owners and communities) to develop
infrastructure and increase salaries
– High level of inﬂation
– Insufﬁcient public sources (limits in
the NHF contracts; delays in payments
by the NHF; no or partial payments for
“overprovision” of services by the NHF)
– Systemic mistakes (e.g.
undervaluation of some services
contracted by the NHF)
–  Lack of regulations against excessive
accumulation of debts
–  Insufﬁcient ﬁnancial control by
public owners over ﬁnancial decisions
of the management
–  Strong pressure on developing
infrastructure and increasing salaries
(competition for public ﬁnancing from
non-public health care providers)
Source: Authors’ own compilation
n year. P
the own
t.Note: There is no hard data on how many entities were indebted in a give
no  separate information on the size of public hospitals’ debt). In addition, 
which  would make it difﬁcult to estimate the size of public hospitals’ deb
regional authorities and hospital directors. They were con-
nected with other organizational changes, such as division
of ZOZs into separate SPZOZs,1 restructuring of hospitals
(e.g. changes in the number and structure of beds and per-
sonnel, development of IT systems), intensive training of
their management and other personnel (e.g. in the princi-
ples of general accounting). The newly established SPZOZs
were ﬁnanced form voivodeships’ health care budgets
according to global budgets and contracting instead of
funding based on budgetary rules.
The second “wave” of transformations that took place
in 1997–1998 and affected the majority of hospitals was
legally “imposed” by the introduction of universal health
insurance in 1999. All budgetary units had to be trans-
formed into SPZOZs in order to contract health care services
with public payers (initially 17 sickness funds replaced
in 2003 by the National Health Fund – the NHF). These
1 ZOZs were introduced in 1973 as integrated health care institutions.
A ZOZ was a huge budgetary unit composed of a general hospital, primary
health care clinics, specialist ambulatory care units, long-term care units,
etc., providing health care for a large population (approx. 100,000 people).
During the transformation from a budgetary unit into a SPZOZ, hospi-
tals  were “freed” from the integrated structure: they were replaced by
separate SPZOZs for different health care functions (e.g. separate SPZOZs
would provide hospital care, primary care, ambulatory care, long-term
care) and/or units providing ambulatory and long-term care would be
privatized.ublic statistics provide information on the total health care debt (there is
ership structure and the number of entities were changing continuously,
transformations had to be done quickly, often with no
or minor internal changes. Debts that had been gener-
ated prior to the transformations were cleared. In the
same year (1999), a new administrative organization of
the country was  introduced: powiats (districts/counties)
were introduced as the intermediate level of territorial
self-government, between the gminas (municipalities), at
the lowest level, and the voivodeships (regions). Powiat
authorities (there are 314 powiats and 65 cities of powiat
status) became the owners/funding bodies for the major-
ity of public hospitals – 429 out of 739 in 2002 (with
the remaining public hospitals owned by the voivodeships
(231), medical universities (52), and others (mainly the
Ministry of Health) (22) [9]). The number of voivodeships
was  reduced from 49 to 16. As a result, the ownership struc-
ture of public hospitals became more complex (introduc-
tion of a new level of ownership – powiat) and more frag-
mented. The number of non-public hospitals grew rapidly
from 38 in 2000 to 160 in 2006 (40 of them were established
in place of the liquidated SPZOZs) ([5], pp. 10–11).
Despite the transformations of budgetary units into
SPZOZs, the public health care sector as a whole continued
to accumulate debts at a growing pace (there is no hard
data on how many entities were indebted in a given year;
see note under Table 1). The indebtedness mainly con-
cerned public hospitals ([18], p. 120) but the scale of their
indebtedness varied greatly, with about 15% of hospitals
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roﬁts [18,15]. As debts were cleared or repaid by the State
n several occasions, some SPZOZs accumulated debts
ith impunity, using debts to develop infrastructure,
ncrease wages and employment, etc., expecting that their
ebts would be extinguished in the future.
. The 2011 Therapeutic Activity Act
.1. Purpose of the reform
The Therapeutic Activity Act was passed on 14 April
011 and came into force on 1 July 2011. It aimed [12] at
chieving a large scale transformation (known under the
erm ‘commercialization’) of public providers into com-
anies governed by the Commercial Code (i.e. a limited
iability company or a joint stock company), and, thereby
t strengthening entrepreneurship in the health care sec-
or. Commercialization was aimed for because SPZOZ were
erceived to be often poorly managed and that there was
 lack of ﬁnancial responsibility. In contrast, Commercial
ode companies were thought to be more efﬁcient. In addi-
ion, the Act aimed at clarifying the legal status of providers.
.2. Political and economic background
A number of experts saw commercialization as a poten-
ial remedy for the unsound ﬁnancial management of the
PZOZs [13]. This was justiﬁed by the neoliberal ideology,
ccording to which public ownership was associated with
ower efﬁciency and worse ﬁnancial performance.
This solution became predominant when the liberal-
onservative Civic Platform came to power in 2007. But
ven before, under the rule of the previous government,
tate assistance was made available to support the process
f transformations (e.g. the 2005 Act on Public Assistance
nd Restructuring of Public Health Care Units). Since Civic
latform came to power, several attempts were made
o achieve a large-scale commercialization, including the
ailed attempt in 2008 to introduce compulsory commer-
ialization (vetoed by the president of Poland) and the
ntroduction, in 2009, the so-called Plan B for hospital
ommercialization, offering State assistance to the self-
overnments that decide to commercialize the hospitals
hey own [13,17].
able 2
ey differences between a Commercial Code company and an SPZOZ.
Commercial Code company 
Ownership and management Public and private sharehold
meeting of shareholders), bo
What  is its proﬁt orientation? For-proﬁt 
Does it pay corporate income tax? Yes 
Can it go bankrupt? Yes 
What is the extent of its ﬁnancial
accountability?
Limited (up to the amount o
Can it generate additional revenues outside the
NHF contracts?
Yes (possibility of selective 
the NHF)
Does  it receive direct public ﬁnancial support? No 
ource: Authors’ own  compilationicy 118 (2014) 153–158 155
Despite these efforts, a large-scale commercialization
has not been achieved. Between 2000 and September 2010,
105 hospitals and 53 hospital wards were transformed
from SPZOZs into Commercial Code. The public owners
retained 100% ownership in the majority of the commer-
cialized hospitals. The decisions to transform were usually
politically motivated and did not always depend on the
ﬁnancial situation of the SPZOZs.
2.3. Content of the reform
The Act on Therapeutic Activity introduced major
changes to the provision of health care services. It
introduced a new legal term of a ‘therapeutic entity’, which
was meant to replace the term health care unit, introduced
by the 1991 Act on Health Care Units. Therapeutic entities
were divided into two main categories: (1) entrepreneurs
(Commercial Code companies) and (2) non-entrepreneurs
(SPZOZs and budgetary units). One of the main objectives of
the Act was to eliminate the legal form of the SPZOZ. This
was to be achieved in two  ways: ﬁrstly, new therapeutic
entities could no longer be established as SPZOZs (except
for mergers of two  or more existing SPZOZs); and secondly,
if the SPZOZs had unpaid debts, their owners had to cover
them within three months of having approved the SPZOZs’
ﬁnancial statements, or else transform them, within 12
months, into one of the legal forms foreseen in the Act
(i.e. a Commercial Code company or a budgetary unit) or
liquidate them [4]. Therefore the Act offered a simpliﬁed
commercialization pathway that bypasses the complicated
liquidation process and established the requirements for
the liquidation or forced commercialization of indebted
SPZOZs.
A Commercial Code company as the legal successor of
the transformed SPZOZ has to take over its assets and obli-
gations. Unlike an SPZOZ, a Commercial Code company may
go bankrupt if it does not manage to cover its debts (see
Table 2 for key differences between a Commercial Code
company and an SPZOZ). The change of the legal form could
thus indirectly stop the accumulation of debts by the hospi-
tals: the threat of bankruptcy may motivate the hospitals’
management to increase hospitals’ operational efﬁciency
(e.g. by cutting the number of staff, increasing the use of




Director, public owner, social council
Not-for-proﬁt
No
No (but it can be liquidated or transformed by
the public owners)
f invested capital) Full
contracting with Limited (all types of services that are provided
under contracts with the NHF cannot to be
offered to private parties, including patients)
Yes (public owners are obliged to cover costs of
investment and repairs)
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Fig. 1. Position of stakeholders and their inﬂuence on the policy process.
Source: Authors’ own compilation. Note: The actual positions of the ter-
ritorial self-governments, hospital managers and personnel were diverse
and the single position shown in Fig. 1 is a great simpliﬁcation. Territorial
self-governments had a weak inﬂuence on the policy process but have a
strong inﬂuence on the implementation of the Act; their position varies
depending on the political afﬁliation and their opinion on the potential
advantages of commercialization; hospital managers have a weak inﬂu-
ence on the policy process but they have more say during implementation;
their position may  be opposed to the position of the hospitals’ owners
and/or medical personnel; medical personnel as a whole has a weak inﬂu-
ence on both the policy process and its implementation (due to the fear of
in 2011, 13 in 2012 and 20 in 2013) [8]. By the end of 2013
only 19% of the State assistance available for commercial-
izations had been used ([16], pp. 9–11). No data is availablelay offs, the likelihood of a strike is low), but some personnel groups may
be  more inﬂuential in certain cases. Patients have some inﬂuence as public
opinion matters, but not very strong as there was  no public consultations.
services and limit or even eliminate provision of the least
proﬁtable ones.
Financial support was offered by the State in order to
encourage transformations, including extinction of debts
stemming from public legal obligations (e.g. from unpaid
taxes and social insurance premiums) and support (e.g.
loans) for covering certain civil obligations. Financial
support was offered for those SPZOZs that started trans-
formation procedures before the end of 2013.
2.4. Policy processes
The 2011 Act on Therapeutic Activity was part of a ‘pack-
age’ of health reforms promised in the election campaign
by the liberal-conservative Civic Platform. The proposals
were submitted by the MPs, not by the government, which
meant that they did not have to be subjected to public
consultations, i.e. the inﬂuence of stakeholders such as
territorial self-governments, hospital managers, personnel
and patients was weak (see Fig. 1 for positions and inﬂu-
ence of various stakeholders). There was no information
campaign explaining the reform to the general public.
The political opposition (the conservative Law and Jus-
tice Party) argued that the proposed changes meant aicy 118 (2014) 153–158
de facto compulsory commercialization of hospitals and
claimed that privatization of public hospitals was the
hidden goal of the new legislation (although commercial-
ization refers to the change of the legal form and not to the
change of ownership, it opens the door to privatization as
the shares or stock of the commercialized company may
be later sold to private investors; [3]). It also stressed that
the transformed SPZOZs, having the right not to provide
unproﬁtable services, could threaten equal access to health
care and thus constitute a breach of the Constitution (the
Constitution guarantees all citizens the right to equal access
to health services ﬁnanced from public sources – limiting or
stopping provision of services may  therefore be unconsti-
tutional). Criticized was also the economic “discrimination”
of the SPZOZ as a legal form (e.g. SPZOZs had additional
obligations towards employees with regards to severance
pay) and the lack of State control over the transformed
hospitals that could threaten the continuity of health pro-
vision in case of a liquidation of an SPZOZ or bankruptcy of
a commercialized hospital [2,4].
The position of the territorial self-governments, hospi-
tal managers and personnel was  not uniﬁed and differed
in case of speciﬁc hospitals – it did not depend on the
hospital’s ﬁnancial situation but rather on the political afﬁl-
iation of the people involved and their opinion about the
potential advantages of the commercialization (irrespec-
tively of their political afﬁliation). The prevailing attitude
has been to preserve the status quo (i.e. not to commercial-
ize) – this was  due to the uncertainty about the outcomes of
commercialization (e.g. fear of bankruptcy) and the fear of
negative reactions from the local communities (who were
suspicious that access to services would deteriorate), espe-
cially given the upcoming local elections in November 2014
([11,16], pp. 15–16). While the inﬂuence of the local self-
governments on the policy process was  weak, it is them
who  decide whether an SPZOZ would be commercialized
(e.g. they can cover the negative ﬁnancial result of an SPZOZ
and not commercialize it).
3. Expected and preliminary outcomes
In 2011 there were 313 non-public and 565 public hos-
pitals including 440 public general hospitals owned by the
self-governments, 43 by medical universities and 34 by the
ministries ([7], pp. 68–9).2
Available data on the exact number of commercializa-
tions are still inconsistent. Some 250–300 SPZOZs, mainly
hospitals, were in need of transformation in 2013 due to
poor ﬁnancial performance but only 40–50 of them were
likely to complete it by the end of that year [1]. According
to the Ministry of Health, between 1 July 2011 (when the
Act on Therapeutic Activity came into force) and 31 October
2013 only 34 hospitals were commercialized (one hospital2 Remaining 48 public psychiatric hospitals were not characterized
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or 2014 but the rate of commercializations seems to have
lowed down signiﬁcantly.
Transformations into Commercial Code companies did
ot prove to be a panacea for the ﬁnancial problems of the
ospital sector. According to an audit conducted by the
olish Supreme Audit Ofﬁce, among the 15 SPZOZs that
ere analyzed ten were still indebted after their trans-
ormation [10]. The few that became proﬁtable after the
ransformation had taken measures to adapt the provision
f inpatient care to the health needs of their populations
nd to the contracts signed with the NHF (e.g. by reduc-
ng the number of beds and/or staff). They took steps
o reduce their operating costs through better organiza-
ion of work, more efﬁcient use of resources, effective
egotiations with suppliers of drugs and medical equip-
ent on prices and terms of payment. They were also
ble to generate additional revenues from the provision
f health care services outside the contracts with the NHF
10]. These changes have been triggered, in some cases,
y the increased ﬁnancial responsibility (i.e. the threat of
ankruptcy) that came with commercialization and the
reater freedom with regards to contracting [10]. How-
ver, it has to be noted that the ﬁrst hospitals that were
onverted into Commercial Code companies, mainly those
hat converted before the 2011 Act came into force, under-
ent signiﬁcant restructuring before the conversion of the
egal form – they achieved sound ﬁnances ﬁrst and only
sed the conversion to legally “freeze” the improvements
ater. The followers, who converted under the 2011 Act,
ften made the legal transformation without any organi-
ational changes – as a result, their ﬁnancial situations did
ot improve after the conversion.
However, some positive reform outcomes are also visi-
le. The Act has a “preventive” effect on the generation of
ew debts: managers of the SPZOZs are afraid that, should
hey be commercialized, they will face greater ﬁnancial
esponsibility and seem to implement more ﬁnancial disci-
line. Moreover, the possibility of commercialization gives
hem more leverage in discussions with the trade unions
the unionists are afraid of commercializations), and may
elp them achieve more ﬁnancial discipline. As a result,
ikely thanks to the 2011 Act, the increase in the level of
ebt in the public hospital sector over the recent years was
ikely lower that what could have been expected given the
ifﬁcult economic conditions in those years.
It has to be noted that the process of commercializa-
ion is not entirely transparent. There is no central entity
hat coordinates it and is responsible for its monitoring and
ssessment. It is therefore difﬁcult to draw more speciﬁc
onclusions.
. Conclusions
The main lesson for Poland and other countries is that
he mere change of the legal form does not guarantee
 better ﬁnancial performance, unless at the same time
nternal changes in the hospitals’ operations are made.
oreover, the external environment in which hospitals
perate should enable these improvements (e.g. services
ontracted by the NHF should be valued correctly). The
xperiences of transformations from the budgetary units toicy 118 (2014) 153–158 157
SPZOZs and from SPZOZs to Commercial Code companies
both demonstrate these points. Alternatively, the existing
legal form of the SPZOZ could have been improved in order
to increase their ﬁnancial discipline, with no need for com-
mercialization.
In order to motivate internal changes and create an
enabling environment for the improvement of the ﬁnan-
cial situation of the hospital sector in Poland, health care
experts call for the following changes:
– Increase control measures over public hospitals in
order to improve their efﬁciency (e.g. eliminate costly
outsourcing, reduce remunerations, increase the produc-
tivity of infrastructure, etc. ([6], pp. 20–22).
– Create of a national hospital network ﬁnanced from pub-
lic sources and establishing regional bodies responsible
for mapping population’s health care needs and adjus-
ting the number and structure of hospital beds to these
needs.
– Simplify the structure of public owners – currently, hos-
pitals in one region may  be owned by the voivodeship,
county and municipal self-governments, with each being
very protective over the hospitals they own. A single
owner would be more prone to introduce changes.
– Improve contracting rules by the NHF and its
payment systems in a way that promotes improve-
ments in clinical effectiveness, quality, and integrated
care.
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